Anwar Nasution
The mud eruption that started in Porong, District of Sidoarjo,
Secondly, the government’s response in handling the impact of mud is very slow. The Government acted slowly in helping the victims and relocating them and the vital infrastructures, such as gas pipe and electricity power transmission, to the safe areas. The victims, who have lost more than 11 thousands homes and two dozen business that have been buried in more than 6 sq km under 20 m deep covering nine villages in Sidoarjo area, could not be helped immediately due to the absence of protection of property rights. Moreover, the choked-off of transportation to the main seaport of Tanjung Perak and
Furthermore, the little progress in prosecution of who are responsible for the drilling failure is also the indication of the government’s slow response. It took nine months for the police to complete the investigation; however, the case has yet to go to trial. Only individual employee and contractor, not the company, are being probed as suspects.
The absence of effective, low cost of enforcement of contract caused a slower response in helping the victims. On 4 December 2006, six months after the eruption occurred, LBI agreed to buy the entire victim’s destroyed properties and pay the compensation cost. The implementation of the agreement was very slow. Few dozen victims have begun to receive compensation promised by LBI. The slow response of the government is partly because the LBI is owned by the family of Mr. Aburizal Bakrie, the Coordinating Minister for Social Affair whose incharge in coordinating the handling of the eruption. The minister is a prominent member of the leading political party. The Bakrie group is a local business conglomerate that has interest in many business sectors, mainly trading and plantations. LBI is the first interest of the group in oil exploration and exploitation.
The Source of Disaster
The eruption started just 150 meters away from the exploratory Banjarpanji-1 well at the time of drilling.(exhibit 1). Banjarpanji-1 well was located in the Brantas Block concession area, operated by Lapindo Brantas Incorporated.
The Brantas Block concession was awarded to Huffco Brantas Inc. in 1990. The name of the operator, Huffco Brantas Inc, was amended to P.T. Lapindo Brantas Inc. (LBI) on April 10, 1996. LBI is owned by PT. Kalila Energy Ltd and Pan Asia Enterprises. After the amendment, the participating interests of the Brantas Block (exhibit 2), have been changed many times from, Huffco Brantas Inc to, finally, LBI (50%), PT. Medco Brantas E&P (32%) dan Santos Brantas Pty Ltd.(18%), as from 2006. LBI acted as the operator. LBI is controlled by the family of Abu Rizal Bakrie, the Coordinating Minister of Welfare,
In exploring the Banjarpanji-1 well, the company sub-contracted the Integrated Drilling Project Management (IDPM) to PT Medici Citra Nusa (MCN), a private company. MCN further subcontracted the work to other companies and acted as the coordinator for the project. The company started to drill (spud in) Banjarpanji-1 well, on March 8, 2006 and reached the depth of 9,279 feet on May 27, 2006. At this depth, the exploration of the Banjarpanji-1 well suffered from a number of drilling problems, such as well kicks, where fluid from the formation penetrates the bore hole, and losses, where fluid or mud from the bore hole leeches out to the formation. When the well reached a depth of 2,834 meters, an eruption of steam, water, and a minor amount of gas was observed at 05:00 a.m. just 150 meters southwest of the well. A mud volcano was born.
Exhibit 2. Location of Brantas Block and Banjarpanji-1 well
The Cause of Mud Eruption
Majority of experts, including the geologists and drilling consultants who assisted BPK in the audit, concluded that insufficient handling of well drilling by LBI had caused a crack in the formation and created channels for the mud in the clay/shale stone formation to flow to the surface. This conclusion is also corroborated by Richard I. Davies and Richard Swarbrick et.al. in the article “The Birth of Mud Volcano,
Other group of experts indicated that earthquakes can create cracks that allow trapped mud to bubble to the surface. On 27 May 2006, an earthquake shook Yogyakarta on the central part of
Operational Negligence Had Initiated the Birth of One of Huge Mud Volcanoes
No steel casings to protect the well created open-hole section of the Bajar Panji-1well plus insufficient handling of the well problems had caused a crack in the formation and created channels for the mud in the clay/shell stone formation to flow into the surface Compared to other similar phenomena, Lusi eruption has a significant volume, duration, and spatial extent.
Tabel 1. Volume, Duration, Artal coverage and rate of seleded large scale modern krupiton from the south caspian sea and trinidad compared to Lumpur Sidoarjo
| | Lektutan (Azertuijan 2001) | Keturdig (Azerbaijan 1950 – Present) | Pipuro ( | Lusi ( |
| Volume | 0.0003 km3 | 0.00045 km3 | 0.025 km3 | 0.012 km3 |
| Duration | 30 Minutes | 18.200 days | 1 day | 173 days** |
| Area | 0.098 km2 | 0.3km2 | 2.5 km2 | 3.6 km2 |
| Average rate* | 0.0144 | 0.000000025 | 0.025 | 0.00007 – 0.0015 |
Started at a rate of 5,000 cubic meters/day, the mudflow reached 170,000 cubic meters at the time of the audit (February 2007)(appendix 1). At the current rate, the cumulative amount of mud within the next 10 years would be able to submerge the whole of Sidoarjo Regency at one meter depth. Geologists are still facing big quandaries in predicting the future of the mudflow. According to Richard I. Davies and Richard Swarbrick et.al., prediction of the next developmental stages is fraught with difficulty, but the unabated very active eruption indicates that a large aquifer has been penetrated. Those experts are confident that some sort of eruptive activity (perhaps at lower-level) will continue for many months and possibly years to come. A region several kilometers wide should undergo sag-like subsidence over the coming months with more dramatic collapse surrounding the main vent. In order to predict what the future impact the Lusi mud volcano has on the local population, a geological modeling and direct measurement of the inevitable land subsidence will help the efforts to mitigate the disaster impact.
The importance of Sidoarjo Regency
The worst affected area is Sidoarjo Regency, a densely populated area with 2,843 person/square kilometer, 1/3 of the density of
Table 2. The Characteristics of Sidoarjo Regency
| 1. Area of the find : | 28,736 Ha |
| a. Rice field | 8,000 Ha |
| b. Sugar cune | 15,729 Ha |
| c. Fishpond | 10,998 Ha |
| d. Others (Manufacturing and residence) | 63, 490 Ha |
| Total area of land | 63,490 Ha |
| 2. Population | 1,682,000 Persons |
| 3. Population desensity (in 2000) | 2,843 person.kg.km |
Sidoarjo Regency plays significant economic roles not only for the neighboring areas such as Surabaya municipality, Gresik Regency in the north, Pasuruan Regency in the south, Mojokerto Regency in the west and Strait Madura in the east, but also for areas such as other provinces in Java and Bali (exhibit 3). Many important infrastructures are functioning as the aorta for goods and services distribution for East Java Province such as: gas pipeline transmission system which supplies gas to a fertilizer-factory in Gresik, toll road and railways which functions as the distribution channel for goods and services for all of East Java, an Electricity Power Transmission which acts as a back-bone system for Sumatera and most of Java (exhibit 4 and appendix 2).
Exhibit 3. Sidoarjo Regency
Exhibit 4. The vital infrastructures map
Government Initiatives
In the beginning, the central government gave the initiatives to handle the disaster to both the company and local (provincial and district) government. The initial efforts failed due to the lack of power, expertise, and resources. In spite of the magnitude of the destruction, the government has not declared the mudflow as disaster. After the failed efforts, the central government took over the management of the disaster through a Presidential decree in September 2006. The government set up the National Team for Handling the Mud Flow in Sidoarjo (National team). This ad hoc unit, which worked for eight months, was assigned to handle the eruption and liaise with various institutions related to the gas and oil mining industry, including local governments at the provincial and sub provincial level, Ministry of Environment, Department of Energy, Mining, and Natural Resources. In general, there are three objectives that the national team wanted to reach: 1) stopping the eruption, 2) mitigating the impacts of the eruption and 3) minimizing the social, economic, and environmental impacts.
With regard to the first objective to halt the eruption, so far, four strategies have been attempted, namely: a) capping the wellhead from above, b) snubbing the well from the sides, c) digging three relief wells and again tried plugging the mudflow from the sides, and d) dropping concrete balls linked by chains to the mud volcano. All the four strategies ended up in failure, making the National Team unable to realize 8 its first aim, even after spending US$ 21.83 million. Currently, the government is considering to use a new but untested strategy, namely, to plug the mud by building a dam around the crater. The amassing mud will be used to counterweight against the out flowing mud from the mouth of the volcano. Many experts, however, believe the flow is unstoppable.
The efforts at mitigating the impacts of the eruption had realized some achievements. A network of dams and barriers has been erected to contain the mud. On September 26, 2006 barriers failed, resulting in the flooding of more villages. Further strengthening of the dam system appeared to contain the sludge and since the end of September no further reports on breaches have been released. However, the government was blamed for not effectively relocating infrastructure and for delay in determining the alternative route for transportation of goods and services. This delay caused excessive traffic along public roads, causing increased transportation costs.
The third objective had been realized with some successes. As the company is expected to fully compensate the victims and some of the clear cost, the National Team facilitated an agreement between the company and the mud eruption victims. In December 2006, the government declared that LBI, the operator of the well, would have to pay US$351 million in compensation to people whose houses had been destroyed by the mud. In addition, the company was expected to pay about US$182 million for efforts to stop the mud between January and March 2007. As of the time of the audit (February 2007), the company had compensated refugees in 9 villages. The company has given US$ 1.837.400,00 for living allowance, US$ 1.794.000,00 for renting allowance, and US$ 164.000,00 for moving allowance (appendix 3). In addition to that, the company also has given US$ 292.631,58 to 21 families to replace homes that had been destroyed by the mud.[1] On March 31, 2007, one year after the mudflow started, a new team has been established by the central government to handle the mudflow. The team could not work optimally due to insufficient authority, expertise, and resources.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The mud eruption has become an ecological disaster that shows no slowing down. At the beginning of the eruption, the volume of flow was 5,000 meter cubic/day and as of February, it reached 170,000 meter cubic /day. The unprecedented event had made a river of mud on the surface, flooding and submerging the surrounding areas. The hot torrential mudflow has buried 9 villages, 10,426 units of houses, 18 schools, 2 local government offices, 15 places of worship, 23 factories, and displaced 26,317 people. It has already inundated and contaminated 306 Ha of paddy fields, 64 Ha of sugar cane field, and 2 Ha of various crops (Appendix 3). The total area that has been inundated is 470 Ha (exhibit 5), which is equivalent in size to the
Exhibit 5. The area impacted by the mud eruption
Infrastructure has been damaged extensively, including toll roads, railway tracks, power transmission systems, gas pipelines and national artery roads, major public roads and the railroad. The gas pipeline transmission blew out in November 21, 2006, taking a number of fatalities. The accident occurred because the ground subsided 2 meters due to the significant outflow of mud and water, and a dike collapsed causing the state-owned Pertamina gas pipeline to rupture. The damage impacted 20% of the national fertilizer supply. The damage has since been repaired. A major toll road was forced to close on November 22, 2006 due to subsidence effect. Another example is the electricity system. Disruptions to the electricity power transmission system will negatively impact the economy in Java, and is likely to affect
Exhibit 6. Infrastructure Dysfunctions
A giant volume of unprocessed mud that was pumped into the
Table 3. The substance of the mud and the water of the mud
| Parameter | Measurement | Parameter | Measurement |
| DHL | 4475 – 6500 um’cm | Chrom total | 0.21-0.93 mg/L |
| COD | 2350 - 2525 mg’L | Amonim | 4,460 – 6,557 mg/L |
| Phenol | 10,37 – 13,17 | H2S | 0.007-200.008 mg/L |
| Chrom (Vt) | 0.033 – 200,036 | | |
Source:
The contaminated water will surely endangers all aquatic biotas in the Porong river ecosystem, threatening its biodiversity. The solid particle of the hot mud poured into the river would solidify thus making layers that would decrease the depth of the estuary. This sedimentation effect to Porong river will put
In the long run, the mud and the water of the mud will threaten the lives of the people who depend on the river for their daily needs. The contaminated fish, through the food chain, will impact the health of the people.
The eruption also puts the region at increased risk of subsidence. In several places around the mud eruption hole, many houses have fissures and many land surfaces have shifted down around 1-5 meters. In the future, the subsidence effect could destroy local infrastructure such as the houses, roads, bridges, and the gas pipe.
The unabated mudflow and the resulting floods had induced further ramifications that have lowered the life-supporting capacity of the submerged area, disrupted economic activities, thus reducing the economic capacities of the affected regions. The ecological disaster has brought about social and economic losses to the people in the Sidoarjo Regency and surrounding regions. The economic losses and financial costs are summarized in Table 4.
Table 4 : Economic and Financial Costs to Sidoarjo and the Surrounding
Regions in the period of 2006 – 2015
| Direct Economic Cost | 2,093,722.53 |
| Infirect Economic Cost | 779,730.53 |
| Economic Cost For Recovering | 589,385.26 |
| Total Economic Cost | 3,452,838.32 |
| Financial Cost | 516,290.76 |
| Cap (Economic Cost V.S Financial Cost) | 2,946,547.56 |
| Note : 1. Economic Cost : The value of negative effect to the asset and people’s income 2. Financial Cost : the value of cash that has been paid plus commitments 3. USS 1 = Rp. 9,500.00 | |
Source:
It should be noted that the difference between economic costs and financial costs to Sidoarjo totaled to US$ 2,946,547,560.00 The gap has to be borne by the people in and around Sidoarjo regency. This gap has decreased their quality of life and slowed the development of the regency. Higher inflation has been also observed. The biggest part of the economic costs have and would be borne by the people (84 %), whilst the remaining portions were borne by the government (7%), Private Companies (6%) and State-owned enterprises (3 %) (Appendix 4).
The Roles of BPK
BPK audited the hot mud flow in Sidoarjo with the assistance of the environmental, geology and regional economy consultants. The main purpose of this audit is to assess the activities in the exploration of the Banjarpanji-1 well, including the concession granting process, the subsequent disaster management processes, and the overall impact to the economy and the environment. The audit focused on evaluating whether all of the activities are in accordance with the law and regulations. Moreover, the audit also used risk based audit methodologies in selecting key areas to be audited. With this approach, the audit has selected the activities above to be the key areas.
Relating to the environmental aspect, BPK focused the audit on the impact of the National Team activities in mitigating the impacts of the eruption. BPK-RI evaluated the impact of building the mud embankments, efforts to terminate eruption, efforts to dispose of the mud in the river. BPK also conducted limited research with environmental consultants in order to assess the quality of the river. BPK also attempted to forecast the impact to environment for the next ten years. In doing this, BPK and the consultants made many assumptions in order to predict the environmental impact in the next two and ten years.
Audit Results and Recommendations
BPK found the following aspects that need to be improved by the government in managing the mud flow in Sidoarjo:
- Some regulations related to the exploration of gas or oil wells have not sufficiently protected the people and the environment. Current regulation only requires the company that wants to explore a gas and oil well to have shallow
- Survey efforts instead of in-depth survey efforts including important impact and risk evaluation.
- There are weaknesses in government monitoring system on oil and gasexploration and exploitation to enforce the rules and regulations and contracts. The monitoring system needs to be revised and improved in order to ensure the exploration and exploitation processes conducted by the production sharing companies, are done prudently in accordance to the best practices.
- The government responses to address the mudflow disaster have been very slow. This has exacerbated the negative impacts of the mishap to the society, environment, and economy.
- In handling the eruption, the government has never conducted a thorough risk assessment in order to develop detailed action plans or activities. Many of the activities including the building of the mud dams were based on temporary (short term) plans.
- There is no consistent result from the researchers about the toxic sludge and water of the mud. The researchers’ opinions are divided into two main groups. One group said that there is no toxic chemical substance in the mud, while another group said there were toxic chemicals in the mud. However, people in nearby villages complained that toxic sludge and water have invaded their drinking water, river, agriculture fields, fish ponds, marine ecosystem, and homes.
In order to improve the quality of the handling of the eruption, BPK made the following recommendations:
- The Government together with other related entities or people should thoroughly investigate the causes of the eruption and prosecute those responsible for causing it.
- The government should officially declare the mudflow as a disaster and take over the management of the disaster to handle the mishap and mitigate its social and environmental impacts.
- The government should immediately help the disaster victims, restore their livelihood, and restore the economy activities of the province by rebuilding and relocating the damaged infrastructures.
- The government should conduct a comprehensive research to ensure the toxicity of the sludge and water.
- The Government should revise and upgrade the policy implementation and monitoring system of the oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities in order to protect the people’s life, the environment, and the economy.
- Based on
Lessons learnt
Handling the Eruption
- The continuous and uncertain status of this particular disaster requires the phases of handling the disaster to be simultaneously conducted. The rehabilitation and reconstruction phases have to be done in the same time when the mud still continues to erupt and give impacts to the surrounding. In this kind of condition, the disaster management has to be supported not only with a sufficient amount of fund, but also skillful, competent, and dedicated people which could work under uncertainty situation. The government needs to make a comprehensive assessment in order to develop a comprehensive and systematic strategy in managing the eruption.
- Moreover, the government should develop disaster regulation(s) or procedure(s) that can be followed by government institutions in handling disasters on this order. When the mud erupted, the government gave all responsibility to the company to handle things. It did not effectively evaluate the magnitude of the disaster. Furthermore the audit showed that the slow reactive actions from the government in fact caused additional losses.
Auditing the Handling of the Eruption
- BPK-RI hired environmental and regional-economic experts to assist the audit team in analyzing the environmental and economy impacts of the eruption. However, it could not discharge the responsibility of BPK-RI to draw audit conclusions. For future audits, BPK-RI needs to have a panel of experts to ensure the rightness and the sufficiency of the methodology and assumptions used by the experts in an audit project including the validity of the data and information. Furthermore, BPK-RI needs auditors with environmental expertise to anticipate the increasing demand of audit with environmental perspectives from the stakeholders. Continuous professional educations for auditors were needed to cope with the most recent environmental issues.
- Auditing comprehensive activities for mitigating the impacts of the eruption needed a lot of resources. Therefore, BPK-RI should select the key activities that provide the highest impact to the environment, society and economy. BPK-RI has to develop and increase the institutional capability to anticipate more complicated audit tasks.
Conclusion
Defective policies and deficient implementation of the policies have created opportunities for conflict of interest to flourish. This, in turn, has impaired the governance as shown by inconclusive actions by the government towards the private sector linked to the disaster. In the future, BPK should be more concerned with the environmental perspectives in conducting any audit. In doing this, BPK should be equipped by sophisticated and applicable methodologies and supported by highly competent auditors with environmental expertise. The government should re-orient their strategies to overcome the disaster impacts comprehensively, as recommended by BPK. (*)
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